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reasons-responsive mechanism that an agent needs in order to be responsible. Chapter 12 addresses a challenge from Manuel Vargas concerning
the plausibility of employing tracing in a theory of moral responsibility—
“tracing” being the idea that an agent will often be responsible for something at a time in virtue of having had control at an earlier time. Fischer’s
responses here are clear and persuasive, although as he himself recognises,
there are some substantial issues to do with how one should individuate
reasons-responsive mechanisms which are left unresolved. Nevertheless,
there is no doubt that Fischer’s account of moral responsibility is one of
the most sophisticated ever developed and as such demands attention
from all who write on such issues. All in all, this is a strong collection of
essays that deserves serious study.

Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates, ed. David Palmer. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014. 248 pages. $90 (hardback).
ALLISON KRILE THORNTON, Baylor University/University of Notre
Dame
Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates is a collection of ten new essays
on libertarianism about free will, specifically as it has been defended by
Robert Kane, a prominent contemporary defender of the view. In addition to the essays, the collection includes a substantive introduction by the
editor, David Palmer, and a clear and compelling final chapter in which
Kane replies to his critics. Kane’s contribution to the volume is especially
valuable. He both illuminates his critics’ arguments and uses the occasion
to clarify, defend, and develop his view in important ways. Throughout,
Kane models productive philosophical exchange. In what follows, I discuss a central thesis from each chapter and highlight Kane’s response to it.
In Part I, “Libertarian Theories of Free Will,” Carl Ginet and Timothy
O’Connor discuss versions of libertarianism that differ according to what
(if anything) causes free and responsible actions. According to Kane, events
are the causes (though in his reply to O’Connor’s chapter 3 of this volume,
he makes an important addendum). In chapters 2 and 3 respectively, Ginet
and O’Connor defend alternatives: non-causalist and agent-causalist accounts respectively.
In “Can an Indeterministic Cause Leave a Choice Up to the Agent?,” Ginet
argues for the view that an agent’s free and responsible actions are not caused
because, on his view, if such actions were caused (even indeterministically),
they would be produced by antecedent circumstances, and if they were
produced by antecedent circumstances, they would “[have] to be viewed as
pp. 239–245
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‘decided’ by those antecedent conditions and not by the agent” (24). Thus
if an action were caused, it could not be up to an agent. But if an action is
not up to an agent, then the agent cannot freely and responsibly perform
it. In reply, Kane denies that indeterministic causal influence of antecedent
circumstances on an action hampers an agent’s freedom and responsibility
in performing that action. He argues that choices can be causally influenced
by antecedent circumstances, while also being “caused or brought about by
the agent, in particular by the agent’s making an effort to bring it about and
succeeding in that effort” (202).
In chapter 3, “Free Will and Metaphysics,” O’Connor argues that when
Kane’s account is “set within a plausible general metaphysical framework,
Kane’s theory and the agent-causal theory [with which Kane’s theory is
intended to contrast] are much closer than has so far been recognized”
(28). To show this, O’Connor draws out two metaphysical commitments
of Kane’s account of free will: first, that mental states are ontologically
irreducible; second, that causation is nonreductive. O’Connor thinks that
the best version of a view that has these commitments is a neo-Aristotelian
causal powers account where what has the causal powers are substances
(or agents). His reasons are twofold. First, “it becomes natural to understand causes as substances” once we “abandon these Humean deflationary projects” (33)—which the second metaphysical commitment requires.
Second, such an account avoids the problem of the disappearing agent.
But as Kane points out in his reply to O’Connor, that all causation is substance causation does not follow from the aforementioned metaphysical
commitments, and Kane has reasons—independent of reductivism—for
maintaining that some causes are events. Moreover, he argues that the
occurrence of event causation does not rule out the occurrence of agent
causation and so does not alone create the problem of the disappearing
agent. In fact, according to Kane, one need not choose between the two
sorts of causation and might even be “tempted to say that my view is not
merely EC (event causal) but [AC] agent-causal and event causal or AC/EC
(if that didn’t sound too much like a rock group)” (206, emphasis added).
Part II, “The Luck Objection,” addresses the luck objection to libertarianism. By way of background, the objection is that if (as libertarianism requires) our actions are not determined, then what actions we perform is a
matter of luck in a way that undermines our freedom and responsibility.
Kane admits that what actions we perform is a matter of luck on libertarianism, but he denies that such luck undermines our freedom and responsibility. In response to the luck objection, Kane argues that an agent can be free
and responsible for deciding to A as long as she was trying to decide to A,
“endorse[s] the outcome as something she was trying and wanting to do
all along” (37), and decides to A in the face of some indeterminacy about
deciding to A. These three conditions are met in some cases of dual efforts,
which are cases where an agent simultaneously tries to make each of two
competing choices or decisions and succeeds in making one of them. In
such cases, Kane argues, no matter which of the competing decisions the
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agent ends up making, she will have been free in so deciding even though
whichever decision she makes is a matter of luck.
In chapter 4, “Kane, Luck, and Control: Trying to Get By without Too
Much Effort,” Alfred Mele takes issue with this reply to the luck objection. Mele notes an additional condition that must be met in dual efforts
cases in order for the agent to decide freely: the agent’s dual efforts must
themselves be freely made. The agent must freely try to decide to A, for example, or else her decision to A (if it comes to that) will not itself be freely
made. The problem, argues Mele, is that this introduces a vicious regress.
In order for an agent to decide freely to A, she must have freely tried to
decide to A. And in order to freely try to decide to A, she must (per Kane’s
answer to the luck objection) have freely tried to try to decide to A, and so
on, ad infinitum. But whether someone can so freely try is an illegitimate
assumption given the question under dispute. Kane’s reply is that the kind
of control an agent is required to have over the effort to decide to A (if
she is to be free in deciding to A) can be “a compatibilist kind of control”
(200). This stops the regress, but, as Mele points out, it introduces another
worry: if the freedom of trying to decide to A is compatibilist, and the
freedom of deciding to A is incompatibilist, then somehow the freedom of
deciding to A “outstrips” the freedom of the effort.
In addition to the worries Mele highlights in chapter 4, there are two
residual worries for a libertarian reply to the luck objection, worries that
John Martin Fischer addresses in chapter 5, “Toward a Solution to the
Luck Problem.” These worries (brought to light by Peter van Inwagen and
Alfred Mele respectively) are that under the assumption of causal indeterminism, first, it is not the agent who makes the crucial difference as to
what she does, and second, we cannot give an explanation of why an agent
chooses as she actually chooses rather than choosing otherwise. These
worries should be troubling to a libertarian because they suggest that
causal indeterminism rules out a responsibility-grounding relationship
between an agent’s prior states and her choices. But Fischer defends the
libertarian against these concerns. He develops a Frankfurt-style example
that shows that indeterminism (and the unavailability of a contrastive explanation that might come with it) is compatible with an agent having the
sort of control required for moral responsibility. In his example, which
he calls the “Random Machine Example,” there is a deterministic world
in which an agent makes a choice for which she is morally responsible.
That is, in that world, the responsibility-grounding relationship between
the agent’s prior states and her choice obtains. In the example, there is
another world, too, like the deterministic world up to the agent’s choice
in all ways but one: in this other world, there is machine that makes the
world indeterministic. The machine can be in a certain internal state, M1,
and if it is, there are two possibilities, each with an equal chance of occurring. The first possibility is that the machine goes to sleep and triggers no
causal interaction with the world. The second is that it initiates a causal
sequence that would preempt the agent from making the choice she made
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in the first, deterministic world. In Fischer’s example, in the indeterministic world, the random machine runs through its internal states, ends up
in M1, and then goes to sleep, so that in both worlds, the agent chooses
and does exactly the same thing as a result of relevantly similar processes.
Fischer argues that even though the second world is indeterministic, the
agent is still morally responsible, for “presumably, the mere existence and
operation of the machine in [the indeterministic world] should not in any
way threaten these claims about the responsibility-grounding relationship” (61). Kane notes that the Random Machine Example reconciles indeterminism with only a semicompatibilist view of moral responsibility, and
he argues that on his view, he can reconcile indeterminism with a stronger
libertarian view of ultimate moral responsibility (see 195–197).
In Part III, “Incompatibilism and Omissions,” Michael McKenna (chapter
6) and David Widerker and Ira M. Schnall (chapter 7) address two different
arguments for incompatibilism, specifically Kane’s preferred “source” or
“ultimacy” argument and a “direct” argument respectively. In chapter 8,
Randolph Clarke considers whether the freedom we supposedly have in
refraining from acting is threatened by incompatibilism or compatibilism.
Kane’s ultimacy argument for incompatibilism depends on these premises: (1) an agent acts freely only if she is the ultimate source of her act,
and (2) if determinism is true, no one is the ultimate source of her acts. On
Kane’s understanding of ultimacy, someone is the ultimate source of her
act only if her act has no sufficient ground, cause, or explanation for which
the agent herself is not responsible. On this understanding of ultimacy, (2)
is clearly true. In “Compatibilist Ultimacy: Resisting the Threat of Kane’s U
Condition,” however, McKenna doubts that Kane’s understanding of ultimacy is the one we ought to have. Unlike many compatibilists, he grants
that there is something to the idea that freely acting agents need to be the
ultimate sources of their acts, but he argues that to the extent that that idea
is plausible, whatever “ultimate” means is something that is compatible
with determinism. He argues that the notion of being an ultimate source
is context-sensitive and that in most of those contexts, something can be
an ultimate source even if determinism is true. For example, we say that a
certain spring in France is the ultimate source of Perrier drinking water, and
yet we don’t think that whether we’re right about that depends on whether
determinism is false. Similarly, McKenna argues, in the context of ordinary
discourse, an agent can be the ultimate source of her actions even if determinism is true. Kane denies that ordinary discourse is the proper context
for evaluating whether an agent is morally responsible. According to Kane,
in the proper context for evaluating whether an agent can in principle be
held praiseworthy or blameworthy, “it does matter whether the agent is personally responsible . . . for becoming the sort of person she is now with the
will she has, or whether the formation of that will is entirely traceable to
factors the origins of which she had no role in producing” (182).
In chapter 7, “The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism,” Widerker
and Schnall defend a version of Peter van Inwagen’s Direct Argument for
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incompatibilism (DA) in which the key premise, the so-called “Transfer
of Non-Responsibility Rule” (TNR), is that if one is not responsible for
p and one is not responsible for its being the case that (p entails q), then
one is not responsible for q. (More precisely, the principle is: p, and if p
and no one is [now] or ever has been even partly morally responsible for
the fact that p, and [p entails q], and no one is [now] or ever has been
even partly morally responsible for the fact that [p entails q], then q and
no one is [now] or ever has been even partly morally responsible for the
fact that q.) Widerker and Schnall argue that DA is dialectically superior
to Kane’s preferred source-based argument for incompatibilism because
Kane’s argument, unlike DA, depends on the controversial (and straightforwardly incompatibilist) assumption that an agent is responsible for her
act only if she is the ultimate source of it (that is, only if the act has no
sufficient ground, cause, or explanation for which the agent herself is not
responsible). But Kane denies that DA has this dialectical advantage. He
argues that, in defense of TNR, Widerker and Schnall appeal to the same
controversial point. Widerker and Schnall, for example, argue that TNR
is supported by the fact that we would find it puzzling were someone to
maintain that an agent (say, Mary) is responsible for an event (say, John’s
death) even though Mary is responsible neither for events leading up to
John’s death nor for the fact that those events entail John’s death. But,
Kane argues, that we find the allegation puzzling presupposes the very assumption of which DA was claimed to be independent. Thus, while Kane
acknowledges the success of much of Widerker and Schnall’s defense of
DA, he denies that DA has the purported dialectical advantage over his
own source-based argument.
In chapter 8, “Freedom, Responsibility, and Omitting to Act,” Clarke
addresses the topic of moral responsibility for omissions, developing “the
skeleton” (121) of a view about the conditions under which an agent is
responsible for omitting to act. On Clarke’s view, whether an agent is directly morally responsible for omitting to act on some occasion depends on
whether she freely omits to act then, and whether she freely omits to act is
constituted by at least some (and maybe all) of the following factors: that
she freely decides not to do the thing in question, that her intention not to
act plays the right kind of causal role, and that she was able to perform the
omitted action. Clarke intends for the agent’s ability to perform the omitted
action to be understood in such a way that his account of freely omitting
to act is “silent on whether the requisite freedom in omitting is compatible
with determinism” (122). Kane, however, fleshes out Clarke’s view in a
way that renders it a strictly incompatibilist account: Kane argues that in
order for an agent to be directly morally responsible for omitting to act, she
needs to have plural voluntary control over the omission (i.e., she needs to
have been able to perform the omitted act voluntarily and intentionally),
and that kind of control is incompatible with determinism.
In Part IV, “The Significance of Free Will,” the authors take up the
question of the significance of libertarian free will—why so many people
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have wanted it and why anyone should. In other work, Kane’s general approach to answering the significance question is to argue that libertarian
free will is valuable because it is required for many other things we value,
like moral responsibility, being the suitable object of reactive attitudes,
and genuine love and personal relationships.
Though he does not go so far as to defend libertarian free will, in “Responsibility for Emotions, Alternative Possibilities, and Reasons,” Ishtiyaque Haji argues that for many things we value, like the attitudes of
forgiveness and guilt, there is at least an alternative possibilities requirement. Such attitudes require alternative possibilities because having them
depends on our ability to act in accordance with what Haji calls “objective
pro tanto reasons.” (For example, forgiving someone requires having as
a reason “being willing to cease to regard the wrong done as a reason to
weaken or dissolve the relationship ” [138].) And in order to act in accordance with such reasons, it must be possible not only for us to so act but
also to refrain from so acting. That is, we must have alternative possibilities. Thus, since some things we value like forgiveness and guilt depend
on being able to act in accordance with reasons, many things we value
depend on there being alternative possibilities. Kane adds two qualifications: (1) that alternative possibilities are not required for every morally
obligated act, but only that acts by which we engage in self-formation; and
(2) that in such acts, we have plural voluntary control over the alternatives.
In “Moral Responsibility, the Reactive Attitudes, and the Significance
of (Libertarian) Free Will,” Dana Kay Nelkin advocates for an approach to
the significance question that she takes to contrast with Kane’s. She suggests that to answer it, we start by considering “what is at stake” in the
debate (such as moral responsibility, reactive attitudes, and personal relationships), explore whether those things really are valuable, and then, if
they are, establish whether they depend on libertarian free agency. While
Kane sees this strategy as a part of his own approach and not an alternative to it (210), Nelkin’s focus on the value of what is at stake is important.
She argues that some valuable and important kinds of personal relationships, like those between friends, spouses, and parents and children, are
defined by the reactive attitudes that people in those relationships are
disposed to have towards one another. These reactive attitudes, Nelkin
argues, presuppose that people have placed certain demands on one another. The reactive attitudes of resentment or indignation, for instance,
presuppose that certain demands have been held to someone but not met.
This relates to the significance question because it seems that holding-todemands in turn presupposes the free agency of the target of the reactive attitude. It thus seems that there are particular, important kinds of
personal relationships that presuppose free agency. Nelkin is neutral on
whether the agency required is libertarian free agency in particular, but
Kane, of course, argues that it must be.
Derk Pereboom, in the “Dialectic of Selfhood and the Significance of
Free Will,” agrees with Kane that holding each other to certain demands
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is both essential to some important kinds of human relationships and that
it presupposes libertarian free agency. Unlike Kane, however, he is skeptical that those kinds of relationships are possible. He argues that much of
their importance can be retained even if they are not possible via similar
relationships that presuppose “a notion of demand that does not require
the ability to do otherwise and a sensitivity to which does not require the
reactive attitudes” (168). The notion he identifies is the demand of axiological recommendation (e.g., “You ought to stop abusing me or it will destroy our relationship”). In contrast with the demand of moral obligation,
which Nelkin’s account of personal relationships requires, the demand of
axiological recommendation is consistent with the agent who is the target
of the demand not being able to do otherwise. A failure to meet this sort
of demand does not—or should not—engender reactive attitudes. For this
reason, the kinds of personal relationships Pereboom gives an account of
seem less valuable and important than the ones discussed by Nelkin and
Kane. Pereboom admits that we would lose something if he is right about
the nature of personal relationships, but he argues that the loss is not very
significant. A disavowal of reactive attitudes in our personal relationships
would not preclude having personal but non-reactive attitudes, like disappointment, sadness, and hurt feelings. And relationships characterized by
susceptibility to those non-reactive attitudes are especially valuable, and,
according to Pereboom, they are valuable enough.
While the collection is limited in scope insofar as it targets only one variety of libertarianism, the authors discuss a sufficiently wide range of topics
and perspectives that the volume would be a valuable addition to a graduate seminar on free will. Moreover, as one of the only volumes devoted to
libertarianism, it makes for an efficient but thorough introduction to the
contemporary debate surrounding libertarianism.1
1
Thanks to Chris Tweedt and Brandon Warmke for comments on an earlier draft of this
review.

Free Will in Philosophical Theology, by Kevin Timpe. New York and London:
Bloomsbury, 2014. 177 pages. $120.00 (hardcover).
JOSEF QUITTERER, University of Innsbruck
Free will is essential for Christian faith. Without free will, there would be
no sin, no guilt, and no moral responsibility. The Christian doctrine of salvation through divine forgiveness and through the sacrifice of Jesus Christ
would be meaningless without free will. On the other hand, the Christian
pp. 245–248
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